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Abstract.A rigorous framework for safety assessment is established in all countries where nuclear technology
is used for the production of electricity. On the one side, industry, i.e. reactor designers, vendors and utilities
perform safety analysis and demonstrate consistency between results of safety analyses and requirements. On
the other side, regulatory authorities perform independent assessment of safety and confirm the acceptability
of safety of individual reactor units. The process of comparing results from analyses by reactor utilities and
regulators is very complex. The process is also highly dependent upon mandatory approaches pursued for the
analysis and from very many details which required the knowledge of sensitive proprietary data (e.g. spacer
designs). Furthermore, all data available for the design, construction and operation of reactors produced by
the nuclear industry are available to regulators. Two areas for improving the process of safety assessment for
individual Nuclear Power Plant Units are identified: New details introduced by industry are not always and
systematically requested by regulators for the independent assessment; New analytical techniques and
capabilities are not necessarily used in the analyses by regulators (and by the industry). The established
concept of independent assessment constitutes the way for improving the process of safety assessment. This is
possible, or is largely facilitated, by the recent availability of the so-called Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty
approach.1 Introduction
The paper deals with Nuclear Reactor Safety Technology
(NRST) involving fission and water cooled or moderated
reactors. NRST is established since several decades,
starting from the discovery of nuclear fission. Well known
events, the latest one being Fukushima, have challenged
the sustainability of nuclear technology and undermined
the trust of the public, of the decision makers and even of
the scientific community toward nuclear safety. Innovative
ideas and proposals are possibly needed to restore the
confidence and escape the irreversible loss of competence,
which also feeds the further degradation of the sustainabil-
ity for this technology.
The legal branch of NRST is known as licensing. A
licensing process is initiated each time the construction is
planned of a new nuclear installation where radioactive
material is present. Any Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)
constitutes a nuclear installation or the concerned facility..dauria@ing.unipi.it
pen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Com
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproductionThe licensing process aims at ensuring the safety of each
NPP unit, as well as at protecting the public and the
environment from harmful radiations.
A Government Body under the control of a Ministry,
typically Industry or Safety-Security Ministry in various
Countries, is responsible for the licensing process and
mandates the modalities which (typically) are part of the
Atomic Energy Act and of the Laws in the concerned
country. The Government Body is known as licenser. The
licenser must approve the safety demonstration prior to the
start of the operation of a facility.
On the other side, there is the owner of the nuclear
installation or facility, which is, typically, the operator of the
concernedNPPunit or the applicant of the licensing process.
Theoperator isknownas licensee.Theoperatormust fulfillall
the obligations set by the licenser, namely making available
any information detail and data related to the facility.
In between the licenser and the licensee, there are
typically other organizations, or institutions, or individua-
ls: examples are the NPP designer and vendor, consultants
including technical support organizations and research
bodies including universities. Those ‘other organizations’
cooperate either with the licenser or with the licensee to
finalize the licensing process.mons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0),
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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constitutes a perfect process and there is no room for
improvement. However, in order to undermine the concept
of perfect process, also showing its complexities, let us
consider the following facts (just three out of many more
examples):
– In order to demonstrate the safety of NPP, analysts need
to calculate temperature and stresses in individual fuel
pins (thickness of the clad is few tenths of mm) solving a
multi-scales and multi-physics problem; providing an
analogy in aeronautics, the given problem is similar to
demonstrate the integrity of a crystal glass glued on the
wing of an airliner following a cycle take-off/trip under
any meteorological condition/landing.– Evidently, there is no countermeasure for the falling of a
meteorite upon a nuclear facility. The same falling in the
region around the facility may also generate earthquake
and tsunami beyond the design limits of the facility. The
issue here is that the probability value for meteorite
fallingmay have changed after the facility has been put in
operation.– Most of the NPP units now in operation have been
designed at a time when computers and computational
tools and methods were not available. The obvious
question arises on how the new findings can be integrated
in the old designs.
Furthermore, it is part of the human nature to optimise
any aspect, whichmay generate a benefit: this is the basis of
progress of civilization. So, designers continuously improve
the system and regulators continuously improve the
techniques to check the design. Namely, within the NRST
independent assessment, i.e. the safety evaluation made by
licenser knowing the construction data of the facility and
adopting methods ‘independent’ of the licensee, is the
foundation to finalize the licensing process. So, where is the
weakness?
In the attempt to address the question, two areas for
improving the licensing process are identified:
– New details introduced by industry are not always and
systematically requested by regulators for the indepen-
dent assessment: for instance, the type of glue used to
attach the glass to the wing may produce unexpected
effects.– New analytical techniques and related capabilities as well
as new evidence are not necessarily used in the analyses
by regulators and by the industry; for instance, any
impact in safety demonstration is calculated from the
change in probability of a meteorite fall.
The experience gained in a recently completed effort to
demonstrate the safety of an NPP in parallel to the safety
demonstration provided by the designer helped in trigger-
ing the issue (or in answering the question “Where is the
weakness?”) and in generating insights into the topics of the
bullet items above. The concerned effort is the licensing
process of Atucha-II in Argentina. Because of irrelevant
events occurred there, the design of the NPP was
completed at the end of 1980s when start and stop
processed of construction also occurred. Construction was
resumed at the middle of 2000s when the original design-
industry was not any more available to supply a ‘new’safety demonstration as requested by the licenser.
Consequently, an independent safety analysis was needed.
The new safety evaluation was completed and approved by
the licenser at the beginning of 2010s [1]. The facility’s
detailed construction data and the latest computational
techniques (i.e. available thirty years after the time of design
of the facility) were adopted. Namely, the effort implied the
use of the so-calledBest Estimate PlusUncertainty (BEPU)
approach, see e.g. reference [2], and the installation and the
operation of an experimental facility [3].
The paper intends to investigate on the two bullet items
and, by discussing some of the BEPU features, to show how
BEPU may represent a reasonable solution for new reactor
safety; this could be of benefit for industry and for
regulators and, definitely for the acceptance of nuclear
plants by the public.2 The features of the BEPU approach
A textbook is needed for a comprehensive description of
BEPU; see e.g. reference [4]. On the one side, it is
straightforward to discuss the outcomes of a BEPU
calculation; on the other side, it is difficult to explain
shortly what BEPU is. Hereafter, some generic BEPU-
definition statements are given, see also Figure 1 for an
overview:– The BEPU is a logical process or an approach which
connects the understanding in nuclear reactor safety (see
also licensing below) with nuclear thermal-hydraulics.– The starting point for BEPU is the understanding of the
phenomena. Thus, BEPU implies the identification of the
accident scenarios which are part of the ‘design basis
envelope’.– BEPU implies the existence of qualified computational
tools including best estimate numerical codes dealing
with different disciplines, input decks or nodalizations
and a method to evaluate the uncertainty. The words
‘different disciplines’ imply the coupling among codes
and the ability to qualify the resulting coupled codes. The
terms ‘best estimate’ and ‘realistic’ have the same
meaning. Both the terms are used to indicate that the
techniques attempted to predict realistic reactor system
response [US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.157, Best
Estimate Calculations of Emergency Core Cooling
System Performance].– BEPU needs the existence of qualified procedures for the
application of the computational tools; see also the
discussion in reference [5].– BEPU needs the existence of qualified code users and of
experts capable of evaluating the results and of
establishing whether additional analyses are needed.– BEPU needs the existence of ‘legal’ acceptance criteria
(e.g. suitable licensing framework).– The application of BEPU implies the deep knowledge of
the licensing process in the country where the nuclear
power plant is built and in the country where the same
plant has been designed. Furthermore, advancements in
licensing process by different international institutions
shall be continuously considered.
Fig. 1. The BEPU process focusing on Accident Analysis and
Chapter 15 of FSAR (NOTE: Acronyms and symbols in the figure
not defined in the paper are, in alphabetic order: ITF= Integral
Test Facility; SETF=Separate Effect Test Facility; SYS TH=
System Thermal-Hydraulics; V & V=Verification and Valida-
tion;ṀECC=Mass flow-rate of injected Emergency Core Cooling;
Ṁw,COND=Condensed mass flow-rate penetrating the core; ṀS,
G=Upward mass flow-rate of steam and gas; Tsat = saturation
temperature; Tw=water temperature).
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(FSAR) must be adapted to BEPU and connections shall
be identified among different chapters; this is specifically
true in relation to the design of the core, the experimental
data drawn during the commissioning period of the plant
and the design of operational and emergency procedures.– Ametaphor canbeused todescribeBEPU:Theknowledge
acquired in nuclear thermal-hydraulics resembles a city
suddenly abandoned by inhabitants; everything is there at
rest and no information is available to trigger the life in the
city. A wild-experienced traveler arriving there feels lost
and unable to use his competence and the existing and
visible knowledge. In the allegory, the wild experienced
traveler is the (expert) thermal-hydraulic specialist; the
city and its components and systems is the nuclear
thermal-hydraulic knowledge and BEPU constitutes the
civilization needed to make the city alive.– BEPU constitutes a process which implies the widest
exploitation of data and information in nuclear thermal-
hydraulics: this can be derived from Figure 1.– BEPU implies the integration betweenDeterministic and
Probabilistic Safety Analysis, i.e. DSA and PSA,
respectively [6].
Due to the above, any BEPU report as well as any
BEPU finding should be a living document or periodically
updated. Proposed developments in the area include BEPU
for all FSAR, see e.g. [7], and the companion paper to the
present paper in this conference [8].3 The connection with independent assessment
Independent assessment (IA) constitutes (as already
mentioned) a recognized concept within NRST which
was proposed with the safety technology; so, the IA concept
is ‘much older’ than BEPU. The message we wish to
provide here is that nowadays the implementation of IA is
not useful without the additional part of BEPU.The first step to clarify the message implies the
distinction between conservatism and Best-Estimate. Let
us attempt to distinguish the two terms in a simplified way,
also through the use of examples.
In a conservative approach,unfavourable valuesareused
in order to take into account uncertainties due to limited
capability of modelling and limited knowledge of phenome-
na, and to simplify the analysis [IAEA Specific Safety Guide
No. SSG-2:Deterministic SafetyAnalysis forNuclearPower
Plants]. In that case, assumed plant conditions and physical
models are set conservatively. For instance, (i) pressure
resistant walls are built with a thickness larger than what is
resulting fromtheavailable theoreticalmodel/equations; (ii)
allowed core operational power is lower than the assumed
power; (iii) in thecaseof thecrystal glass glueduponthewing
of an airliner, the conservative solution to use the glass at the
end of the trip is to carry it on board into a protective
envelope. Expertise, possibly coming from previously built
and operated facilities, is needed to confirmthe acceptability
of conservatism. Thus the designer and the owner of the
facility (may) have the needed expertise to fix the
conservatism.
The word ‘Best-Estimate’ implies the use of validated
models/equations according to the best practice available to
the scientific community and the capability to prove the
quality of results. However, the word ‘uncertainty’ which
appears in the acronym BEPU also corresponds to lack of
precise knowledge. In this case, proper methods, procedures
and data are collected to estimate the contribution of the lack
ofknowledgetotheendresult (i.e. thedesignortheoperational
parameters of the facility). Qualified groups of analysts (may)
have the competence needed to estimate the uncertainty.
The last step to clarify the provided message deals with
the two bullet statements of the Introduction of this paper.
The industry attitude is toward a more efficient product
to win the competition with other industries (first bullet
item). This involves, among the other things, the implemen-
tation of feedbacks from experience and the transport of
applied R&D results into the production. Details of design,
construction and operation are continuouslymodified (well-
known example is the configuration of spacer grids in the
core). Sample connected-or-consequent facts are: (i) safety
impact of any change may not be evaluated as relevant; (ii)
there is no benefit to make available (e.g. to licenser)
proprietary data. Definitely, some facility related data may
not be made available to the licenser, even though the
commitment of the licensee to all-data-access is kept.
Parallel to industry activity, research is ongoing in
several areas, e.g. to improve computational methods
applicable for safety evaluations. Licensers (other than
licensees) may not necessarily be aware of those develop-
ments (second bullet item).
Easy inference is that the best possible IA is not
performedunderpresent conditions; i.e. not all designdetails
are available, not the most sophisticated methods are used.
The solution is to combine BEPU and IA under a new
framework [9]. This means the introduction of a new level of
safety evaluation which removes the drawbacks discussed
under the first and the second bullet item and keeps the IA
feature.Theproposal in reference [9] is tocreatea consortium
of competence of senior experts (already called COCO-
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who have access to licensee data, perform IA and refer to the
licensee,without infringing thedataproperty condition.The
same experts guarantee the licenser about fulfilment of
regulatory requirements by issuing a parallel BEPU-based
FSAR. The complexity of implementing the proposed
consortium is recognized together with its cost.
4 Conclusion
BEPU is needed to assess the conservatism in the design and
the operation of NPP. Possibly, suitable conservatism can
only be introduced by NPP designers or owners based on
expertise which comprises operation of similar plants,
proprietary best estimate analyses and measured data. In
other terms, designers/owners of NPP are expected to own
best estimate information and to make available conserva-
tive information to the regulator. This covers the best
available data and prevents the disclosure of proprietary
information. A licenser, in contrast, may not have the
expertise of the designer/owner and may not be able to fix
suitable conservative values for parameters which are input
to the analyses for safety demonstration. Thus, BEPU may
reveal as the only logical approach for the licenser for an
independent assessment of the licensee submission: the
uncertainty in input parameters is derived ‘independently’
and substitutes, and eventually is consistent with, the
conservatism of the licensee based on proprietary best
estimate information.
Furthermore:
– BEPU process or approach uses knowledge of system
thermal-hydraulics.– The BEPU idea may be seen as having a direct
connection with the “As Low As Reasonably Achievable
(ALARA)” principle for minimizing the contact between
harmful radiations and humans: BEPU approach implies
the best tool to estimate fission product releases and the
margins to the related acceptability thresholds.– BEPU must be adopted for the entire FSAR (the BEPU
extension from nuclear thermal-hydraulics to the entire
FSAR topics is not discussed in this paper): this appears
a logical follow-up of the findings and of the expertise
gained by the scientific community during the last couple
of decades in the nuclear safety evaluation area.
The key conclusion for the paper is the need to combine
BEPU and Independent Assessment. A specifically created
consortium of competence may demonstrate to be
functional to this aim within an innovative safety
framework.
Finally, BEPU approach, including BEPU used by
independent assessors andBEPUcovering the entire FSAR,
guarantees a higher level of confidence in the safety
evaluation than what is reached and accepted nowadays.
Namely, BEPU activities constitute software types of
activity, as such; the safety level of existing nuclear facilities
is not modified by performing BEPU analyses; only ifinconsistencies are found related to acceptability criteria,
changes in hardware or safety parameter limits may follow
from BEPU studies. However, the completion of BEPU
activitiesmaybe thebasis of creatinganadditional barrier to
the release of fission products; this can be achieved by
considering the extensions of the concept of safety margins
[10]; a well-based series of revised safety signals can be
planned following BEPU analyses for the entire FSAR.
The BEPU connected with independent assessment
involving the application to the entire FSAR and the
design/implementation of NPP signals continuously
measuring the extended safety margins have the potential
to reduce by a quantifiable way the possibility of core
degradation, disasters like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl
and Fukushima can be prevented.References
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